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Abstract 
 
Imizamo Yethu is an informal settlement in Cape Town, South Africa, characterised by 
abject poverty and high vulnerability to environmental hazards. On February 8, 2004, a 
major fire caused significant damage to the settlement’s housing and infrastructure, 
resulting in widespread homelessness and loss of personal possessions.  Despite the 
intensity of the event, there were minimal casualties and the community re-grouped 
after the fire despite overwhelming odds. What was the source of this resilience amidst 
such disadvantage?  A survey focusing on this question was conducted in 2004 with 
Imizamo Yethu residents. Results identified social networks and some formal 
community institutions as the most significant factors enhancing respondents’ 
resilience during and after the fire. However, the survey also disturbingly revealed that 
political divisions centering on a land rights dispute within the community, and on-going 
housing issues, were undermining community resilience. Disrupted social networks and 
eroded community cohesion caused by political factors have the potential to further 
diminish resilience against hazards in the future.  
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Introduction 
 
 
Recent studies and policy documents in the field of environmental hazards 
management have highlighted facto1rs contributing to community vulnerability and 
resilience (e.g. Blaikie et al., 1994 & 2004; Buckle, Marsh & Smale, 2001; Handmer, 
2003). A notable literature is also emerging in the area of analysing community 
resilience and vulnerability to natural hazards in less developed countries (e.g. 
Campbell, 2001; King & Gurtner 2003; Macatol & Reser 1999; Shaw et al. 2003, Yates 
& Anderson-Berry 2004). In keeping with such research, Harte (2005) analysed 
vulnerability and resilience in the socially and economically disadvantaged community 
of Imizamo Yethu, located in Cape Town, South Africa (Figure 1). A major fire in 
February 2004 provided an opportunity for field research to examine the impacts of a 
major hazard event on the community and how it responded. While social and cultural 
characteristics appear to be strong countervailing forces with regard to disadvantage 
and vulnerability to hazards, the maneuverings of local political factions have emerged 
as a key factor threatening to erode resilience in this community. This paper reports the 
key findings from this research.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Imizamo Yethu informal settlement, South Africa. 
(Adapted from African National Congress, 2004 and Gawith, 1996, p.79) 
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The Case Study Settlement: Imizamo Yethu 
 
 
South African cities today are experiencing large rural to urban migration flows. In most 
large urban areas this has resulted in “informal” or squatter settlements around 
metropolitan areas that are generally characterised by poverty, a lack of formal 
planning, a high proportion of self-constructed shacks and a lack of infrastructure. As a 
consequence of these landscape characteristics, there is a heightened degree of 
vulnerability to a range of environmental hazards in these localities.  
 
Imizamo Yethu was established in 1991 to house 455 squatter households from the 
Hout Bay valley1. The site of the settlement comprises 34ha of land,18 ha of which is 
zoned residential and 16ha that was to remain as ‘greenbelt’ or later be developed into 
community facilities such as schools and clinics  (Figure 2). The original 455 relocated 
households were to be given brick houses on individual serviced sites. This 
development, however, did not proceed as planned. Not all of the households received 
a brick house on a serviced site. Furthermore, once established, Imizamo Yethu 
experienced a major unplanned influx of new residents (Informal Housing Sector: 
Public Housing, 2003). Consequently, Imizamo Yethu took on the characteristics of an 
informal settlement. The following sections will briefly outline the features of the local 
landscape salient to its vulnerability and resilience to environmental hazards. 
 
 
Housing and infrastructure 
 
 
Housing in the settlement is dominated by self-constructed shacks, made from 
plywood, masonite, timber boards, plastic sheeting, advertising boards and corrugated 
iron. In addition, there were approximately 100-200 brick houses complete or in the 
process of being built with external assistance (at the time of the fieldwork). Access is 
limited, with only one major road into the settlement, and few maintained roads within 
the densely populated site itself. Water is obtained mainly from a limited number of 
communal taps, which are sometimes inoperative. Electricity is available, but frequently 
accessed illegally by households rigging their own connections to existing lines. The 
key energy source is paraffin fuel, which is used within the shacks for heating and 
cooking. In combination, these attributes of the built environment increase the 
vulnerability of the settlement, notably to fire risk as a result of poor infrastructure and 
the nature and use of energy and fuels. 
 
 
Population and Culture 
 
 
There are variations in the counts of the total population of Imizamo Yethu, depending 
on the statistical source. These include the official 2001 South African Census data 
(8,052) (Statistics South Africa, 2003); Development Action Group (2003) (7,874); 
Informal Housing Sector, Public Housing (2003) (between 10,000-18,000). The latter 
figure is supported by analyses of aerial photographs of the settlement in 2000, which 
reveal an estimated population of 13,000 based on the conservative figure of four 
people per dwelling (Informal Housing Sector: Public Housing, 2003). The difficulty in 
establishing even basic population counts is indicative of the fundamental impediments 
to effective hazard management in such communities. The reliability and validity of 
population data for Imizamo Yethu meant that most of the data required for the present 
study needed to be gathered directly.  
                                                 
 
 4
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Land-use zoning in Imizamo Yethu  
(Adapted from Public Housing Directorate, 2004) 
 
 
 
 
Extent of Area Destroyed by Fire on 8 February 2004 
Area Designated for Less Formal Settlement in Terms of Less 
Formal Township Establishment Act No. 113/1991 
Iziko Lobomi community centre 
16ha of community facilities / green belt zoned 
land 
Scale: 1:5000 
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The majority of people living in Imizamo Yethu belong to the Xhosa cultural group. 
Most originally migrated from the Eastern Cape to the Cape Town region (see Figure 1) 
in search of employment and many regularly return eastward, maintaining strong ties 
with family and friends. The socio-cultural networks are therefore complex systems 
which extend well beyond the settlement. For the Xhosa people, ancestors are an 
integral part of the social system. Their beliefs are particularly relevant to hazard 
vulnerability and resilience in that the Xhosa culture dictates that one’s ancestors will 
be angered if one does not help immediate and/or extended family members who need 
assistance, regardless of the financial and material difficulties associated with 
rendering this assistance (Lohnert, Oldfield & Parnell, 1998; Xhosa interviewee, 2004). 
This cultural belief strongly reinforces the role of social networks in Imizamo Yethu’s 
predominantly Xhosa society. 
  
 
Politics 
 
 
There are political divisions in the settlement that are underpinned by land rights 
issues. The main stakeholders involved in the ‘politics’ of Imizamo Yethu are the 
Sinethemba Civic Association (Sinethemba), the South African National Civic 
Organisation (SANCO) and the Hout Bay Ratepayers Association (HBRA).  These 
groups are differentiated on the basis of their views on the uses of the remaining 
vacant land within Imizamo Yethu. These political divisions in Imizamo Yethu influence 
resource allocation and have an impact on community cohesion. This aspect will be 
particularly highlighted in this paper.  
 
 
The case study hazard event: February 2004 Fire  
 
 
On the 8 February 2004 a serious fire in Imizamo Yethu caused widespread damage to 
the settlement (Figure 3). Estimates of the number of dwellings destroyed range from 
461 (Disaster Management, 2004) to 1,200 (Dreyer & Kassiem, 2004, p.1; Kemp, 
2004, p.1) and for the number of people affected from 645 families (Disaster 
Management, 2004) to 5,000 people homeless (Dreyer & Kassiem, 2004, p.1; Kemp, 
2004, p.1). The ‘official’ Cape Town City Council figures are that 570 dwellings were 
destroyed (Public Housing Directorate, 2004). The cause of the fire was not determined 
(Disaster Management, 2004; Mandisa Database, 2004). Despite the scale of this fire 
event, Imizamo Yethu remained a viable, functioning community. This was evident in 
discussions with residents who stated that they wished to remain in Imizamo Yethu and 
rebuild in the settlement. Harte (2005) reported that there had been no significant out-
migration, and normal day-to-day activities had continued in the recovery phase of the 
fire. There were, however, opportunities for relocation. For example, housing was also 
available through the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) in other 
settlements in the Western Cape district of Cape Town (see Figure 1). Despite such 
opportunities, most residents appear to have chosen to remain in Imizamo Yethu 
(Harte, 2005). Poor economic circumstances of the residents were also a barrier to 
moving to other areas.   
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Figure 3 Extent of 8 February 2004 fire in Imizamo Yethu 
(Adapted from Public Housing Directorate, 2004) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extent of Area Destroyed by Fire on 8 February 2004 
Area Designated for Less Formal Settlement in Terms of Less 
Formal Township Establishment Act No. 113/1991 
Scale: 1:5000 
 7
The survey 
 
 
An interview survey was conducted in Imizamo Yethu in 2004, five months after the fire 
event, allowing the researcher the opportunity to capture essential aspects of the 
ongoing recovery phase. Respondents were residents / households who had been 
directly affected by the February 2004 fire. Further background information was 
collected from representatives of “formal networks” (Department of Housing 
(Directorate and Informal Sector), Disaster Management Cape Town, the South African 
Red Cross Society, church organisations and NGOs) relevant to the recovery situation. 
Respondents were asked to nominate the most important factors enabling them to 
survive in the response and recovery phases of the fire2. Primary data was also 
collected from field observations in the community.  
 
Thirty people, representing thirty households directly affected by the February 2004 
fire, were interviewed. The size of the sample population allowed the results to be 
analysed for frequencies and patterns, however it did not allow the results to be 
statistically generalised.  Specific characteristics of the sample are shown in Table 1.  
Objectively testing the representativeness of the sample was also difficult due to the 
uncertainty of the demographic statistics available for the community. In summary, the 
sample was dominated by respondents of the Xhosa cultural group, most of whom 
were female, unemployed and headed single-parent households. There were 
reportedly children in over two-thirds of the sample households at the time of the fire. 
Two households were supervised by children on the night of the fire. Almost one-third 
of respondents were reportedly in households of greater than four people on the night 
of the fire. Though difficult to formally establish, from discussions with the community 
members, the researcher concluded that this sample was reasonably representative of 
the wider community, but with some gender bias.  
 
For personal safety, it was necessary to conduct the resident interviews during daylight 
hours on weekdays. This largely excluded interviewing people who work day-shifts 
during the week, perhaps adding to the gender bias of the sample. The semi-structured 
interviews were conducted in a combination of Xhosa and English. The researcher has 
some fluency in the local Xhosa language, but racial differences between the 
researcher and respondents could have had a potential impact on the effectiveness of 
the survey instrument through subjectivity and biases. As a strategy to overcome this, 
and to minimize possible distrust and misunderstandings by the participants, the 
researcher worked closely with an appropriate local Xhosa individual. At the same time, 
however, the involvement of the local personality delivered its own set of problems. 
Imizamo Yethu is a politically divided community (see below), and care was taken to 
engage, as far as possible, an impartial community member to fulfil the role of go-
between for the survey work.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 8
Table 1. Basic characteristics of the Imizamo Yethu survey sample 
Total number of respondents 30 
Xhosa People 28 
23 female Gender 
7 male 
Largest age group of respondents: 20-40 
years 
13 respondents 
24 shack 
4 community centre 
Accommodation type (at interview) 
2 brick house 
13 outside boundaries of Imizamo Yethu Location of accommodation (at interview) 
17 within Imizamo Yethu 
Households with children present in response 
phase 
21 
Single-parent households 8 
Child-headed households in response phase 2 
Lone person households 3 
Households with more than 4 people present 
in response phase 
9 
Unemployed respondents (at interview) 15 
Unemployed respondents (in response 
phase) 
13 
 
 
Factors enhancing resilience 
 
 
Resilience is the ability of a community to recover and return to a sense and condition 
of normality following a disaster. Two of the major factors found to be prominent in 
enhancing community resilience in Imizamo Yethu were the operation of social 
networks and support from specific formal institutions and their networks. 
 
 
Social networks 
 
 
The maintenance of social networks is firmly entrenched in the Xhosa culture; having 
family and friends in the settlement was the reason given by most survey respondents 
for choosing to live in Imizamo Yethu. In terms of the help actually provided, the most 
frequent responses in the residents’ survey related to family and friends facilitating 
rapid and successful evacuation in the response phase of the fire, and providing 
material, financial resources and accommodation during recovery. Comments indicated 
that this support was ongoing, in accordance with the cultural norm. These findings are 
consistent with those of Campbell (2006), Yates and Anderson-Berry (2004), Nomdo 
and Coetzee (2002), Shorten et al. (2003) and Handmer (2003) who propose that 
social networks are a key determinant of community resilience.  
 
 
Formal networks 
 
 
Only the formal networks that fostered community participation were nominated by 
respondents as being important to their response and/or recovery. The main institution 
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that was most frequently mentioned was Iziko Lobomi community centre. This is 
located on the main road into the settlement (see Figure 2). It provides the community 
with a venue in which to hold community-based activities on a daily basis, including 
religious gatherings, food preparation, communal meals and supporting livelihood and 
employment. Iziko Lobomi also provided temporary accommodation for some fire 
victims in the recovery phase. Importantly, in terms of hazard response and recovery, 
the centre facilitated access to volunteers and government agencies, and acted as a 
main distribution point for donations after the fire. As an existing and familiar feature of 
the community, it provided a trusted and practical source of support for victims. A 
further factor in the success of Iziko Lobomi as a support base was its location. 
Situated on the main road near the entrance to the settlement, it provided a visible, 
accessible point of contact between Imizamo Yethu and the wider community. 
Churches had a similar, but reportedly less visible role in recovery from the fire.  For 
respondents, being associated with a particular church or congregation conjured up 
immense pride and a sense of belonging.  
 
Significantly, while both Iziko Lobomi and the churches were credited by respondents 
with providing ongoing material, emotional and spiritual support in the recovery phase,  
support from other institutions (such as government agencies) was perceived to have 
faded soon after the event. 
 
 
Factors eroding resilience 
 
 
The survey revealed that there were also significant political forces that were 
threatening to undermine the factors described above contributing to community 
resilience.  
 
 
Three Political Forces 
 
 
Three clearly identifiable political forces, pre-dating the 2004 fire, operate in the 
community of Imizamo Yethu. Political differences are centered on a land rights dispute 
involving land use decisions on the 16ha of land earmarked for public 
greenbelt/community facilities. In the months after the fire, tension over this matter 
among the three political forces intensified.  
 
Sinethemba Civic Association (Sinethemba) represents the original 455 households 
relocated from Hout Bay in 1991. Sinethemba’s view is that it is in the interest of the 
original inhabitants that further in-migration to the settlement does not take place 
because their access to land and resources within the settlement would be potentially 
reduced. Sinethemba wanted the greenbelt land to be used for its original purpose:  
greenbelts and future community facilities, but not housing. 
 
The South African National Civic Association (SANCO) is an African National Congress 
(ANC)3 backed civic organisation, which evolved out of various organisations during 
Apartheid that mobilized the masses against the state (Zuern, 2004). SANCO defines 
itself as “a revolutionary social movement seeking to promote people-driven and 
people-centered development’’ (Zuern, 2004, p.23). SANCO is supporting residential 
development on the 16ha of land zoned for greenbelt/ community facilities. Some in the 
wider community suggest that it is in SANCO’s interest to encourage further settlement 
in Imizamo Yethu because this may lead to an increase the ANC’s power-base in this 
electorate. SANCO argues that development of community facilities on the 16ha would 
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further isolate Imizamo Yethu from the Hout Bay community facilities, thus perpetuating 
social differences between the two contrasting communities (SANCO community 
leader, personal comment, 2004).  
 
The Hout Bay Ratepayers Association (HBRA) is a community group that represents 
the (mainly white) ratepayers of the wealthy suburb of Hout Bay. The HBRA is 
concerned about crime rates and property devaluation adjoining Imizamo Yethu 
settlement. It is in the interests of the HBRA that the population of the lower socio-
economic community of Imizamo Yethu not be increased. HBRA also wanted the 16 ha 
of land to be used for its original purpose: greenbelts and future community facilities, 
but not housing. 
 
 
Escalating Tension  
 
 
Shortly after the fire in 2004, the Cape Town City Council (the City), which at the time 
of the fieldwork was controlled by the ANC, began removing trees from the 16ha of 
land. The reasons they gave for this action were threefold: to decrease the fuel load 
and therefore reduce the fire risk; to provide temporary space in which fire victims 
could rebuild their shacks; and to later develop serviced sites with brick houses 
(Carney, 2004; Disaster Management, 2004; Dreyer & Schroeder, 2004).  
 
As mentioned above, Sinethemba and HRBA did not want the remaining 16ha of land 
in Imizamo Yethu to be rezoned or developed for residential purposes. Consequently, 
in March 2004 Sinethemba and HRBA successfully obtained a High Court interdict to: 
 Prevent the City from removing trees from the 16ha of land 
 Prevent new people from settling in Imizamo Yethu 
 Prevent any new dwellings from being erected in Imizamo Yethu  
 
This High Court interdict had unexpectedly negative outcomes for the fire victims since 
it prevented them from legally rebuilding their shacks anywhere in Imizamo Yethu, if 
they had not already managed to do so immediately after the fire (including on the 
16ha parcel of community land). It forced many fire victims and their households to 
move in with family or friends. Six respondents in the survey reported that their 
“temporary” shared accommodation was too small. For example, one household 
consisting of seven children and six adults was sharing a single shack with relatives. 
Seven members of another household, including an infant and other children, were 
sleeping on one double bed mattress and a sofa in a shack of approximately 9sqm. A 
common complaint was that the shared living arrangements created difficulties in their 
relationships with family and friends. Having to share financial and material resources, 
cramped living space, food, bedding and clothes for a prolonged period strained the 
relationships on which the social networks that create resilience depend. 
Accommodation arrangements resulting from the political maneuverings were, thus, 
contributing to the erosion of resilience in the community. 
 
In mid-2004 the City applied to amend the ‘Less Formal Township Establishment Act’ 
(no 113/1991), which would overturn the High Court ruling and allow development to 
take place on the 16ha of community land in Imizamo Yethu. The development would 
ultimately provide 226 new brick houses on serviced sites (Nicks, 2004, Public Housing 
Directorate, 2004). Fire victims, however, were not given priority on the housing list. In 
October 2004 a prominent SANCO community leader told a major Cape Town 
newspaper that only 24 of the 570 ‘official’ households that were affected by the fire 
would receive new brick houses (cited in Maposa, 2004a). While the development 
would benefit some fire victims, the concern over allocation of housing was a cause for 
concern among all of the respondents interviewed: 
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 ‘The community leaders all have brick houses.’ 
‘The community leaders’ brick houses take on average three weeks to be built and are 
strong, whereas the residents’ houses are built in one week and are weak and beginning 
to crack.’ 
 
The suspicion of corruption and jealousy over housing allocations after the fire led to a 
perception of inequitable distribution of resources. This promoted feelings of distrust of 
community leaders and resulted in a fragmentation of the community on the basis of 
perceived alliances. Inevitably, this was observed to be undermining social cohesion.  
 
Respondents also complained about the bullying tactics of some community leaders. 
There was an overwhelming sentiment among the respondents that they had lost 
confidence in community leaders. Indicative comments of this distrust made by the 
survey respondents include: 
 
 ‘The community leaders promise land to people but do not deliver’ 
‘The [SANCO] community leaders sold the plots out from underneath us [12 years ago] 
and kept the money. The police have not done anything about it. We are still waiting to 
receive our site. We have been waiting for 12 years in this filth. Our children are born in 
this filth.’ 
‘We saw people donate food, clothes and other material for the fire victims, but we 
received nothing. We only saw the community leaders distribute the second-hand clothes. 
They filled their cars and drove away … they did not even give to the elderly.’ 
 
Such actions have created social disharmony, undermined social cohesion and 
therefore negatively impacted on community resilience.  
 
 
Forced Relocations  
 
 
In addition to the above-mentioned accommodation changes for fire victims, more 
residents were forcibly relocated as a result of a further housing development. In mid-
2004 the City began re-developing a densely populated area in the 18 ha of residential 
land which resulted in the removal of households already settled in this area. A 
representative of the Public Housing Directorate (2004) suggested that between three 
and four squatter households would be displaced for every single serviced site that was 
developed in informal settlements such as Imizamo Yethu. The City used 
representatives from Disaster Management (DM) and the Southern Peninsular 
Municipality (SPM)4, as well as SANCO community leaders, to remove people from the 
area to some land outside the Imizamo Yethu boundary in the foothills of 
Skoorsteenkop Mountain, part of the Table Mountain Range. By doing this, they 
relocated already vulnerable residents from a familiar setting to an area that is at 
greater risk of fire. The fynbos vegetation5, common in the rocky terrain of the foothills, 
the steep slope of the land, the lack of infrastructure and the lack of road access all 
increase the vulnerability of the relocated families. Comments made by respondents 
illustrating this include: 
 
‘We have been forced to move up the mountain. There is no electricity here, so we have 
to use liquid paraffin for cooking, lighting and heating.’ 
 
(The respondent said that she) is very concerned about living on the side of the mountain 
as she remembers the fire on the Table Mountain range in 2000. She is concerned now 
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as she is not only at risk from fires in Imizamo Yethu, but also from fynbos fires from the 
mountain. She is very worried about this. (Interpreted). 
 
Despite assertions from a DM representative (2004) that households were not forced to 
move, five of the 11 respondents who were living on the side of the mountain claimed 
that they were forced to relocate there by DM, SPM or SANCO community leaders. 
They said they were given no other choice but to move, or have their shack torn down 
and their valuable housing material damaged in the process. The forced relocations 
disrupted existing social networks by moving households away from their familiar 
neighbourhoods (people often build their shacks next to kin) and also led to social 
disharmony by placing households next to unknown and sometimes culturally 
incompatible neighbours.  
 
Clearly, there was a serious lack of communication and consultation by the City with 
Imizamo Yethu residents concerning this new housing development. Most of the 
respondents who had been relocated were uncertain as to where they would be 
allowed to live in the longer term. Ten of the 11 respondents living on the side of the 
mountain were given incorrect and misleading information about where they would be 
allowed to settle. Some were told incorrectly that they would be allowed to return to 
their original plot of land and others were simply told that they would be allowed to 
return to Imizamo Yethu. Only one respondent had been informed correctly that the 
City was planning to relocate households away from the Hout Bay area. This lack of 
transparency, communication and consultation with the community disempowered 
community members and, again, had a negative result on social cohesion – a key pillar 
of community resilience, as previously outlined. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
While there are indicators of strong community resilience in Imizamo Yethu, for 
example social networks and some formal institutional support, the efficacy o`f these is 
at risk. Suspicion and the perception of inequitable resource allocation, underpinned by 
the political dynamics of Imizamo Yethu, have caused rifts within the community. These 
in turn have impacted on community cohesion and therefore negatively affected 
community resilience. Preventing fire victims from re-establishing in Imizamo Yethu 
after the fire and the subsequent physical relocation of some households to the foothills 
of Skoorsteenkop mountain, disrupted existing social networks and increased the 
vulnerability to fire hazard of an already inherently vulnerable community.  
 
 
 
Notes 
 
 
1 These squatter households had been living in five separate communities around the Hout Bay 
valley during the period of the Apartheid regime. 
2 The term “response” refers to the period during the actual hazard event and its immediate 
aftermath (Koob, 1998). The term “recovery” refers to longer-term adjustment involving the 
reconstruction of physical infrastructure, and the restoration of emotional, social, economic 
and physical wellbeing (Koob, 1998). Typically, in informal settlement fire hazard/disaster 
events, the response phase is characterised by rapid evacuation during the event, and the 
recovery phase (out of necessity) is characterised by almost immediate reconstruction of the 
built environment and search for relief assistance. 
3 The ANC was the ruling political party in South Africa at the time of the fieldwork. 
4 DM and SPM are both government agencies in an ANC-controlled government. 
5 Fynbos (‘fine bush’) is the name given to the dominant evergreen, hardy vegetation of the 
Western Cape. Fynbos relies on fire for germination in the dry summer months. 
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